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Multi-user quantum key distribution with collective
eavesdropping detection over collective-noise
channels
Wei Huang, Qiao-Yan Wen, Bin Liu, Fei Gao
Abstract—A multi-user quantum key distribution protocol is
proposed with single particles and the collective eavesdropping
detection strategy on a star network. By utilizing this protocol,
any two users of the network can accomplish quantum key
distribution with the help of a serving center. Due to the
utilization of collective eavesdropping detection strategy, the users
of the protocol just need have the ability of performing certain
unitary operations. Furthermore, we present three fault-tolerant
versions of the proposed protocol, which can combat with the
errors over different collective-noise channels. The security of
all the proposed protocols is guaranteed by the theorems on
quantum operation discrimination.
Index Terms—quantum cryptography, quantum key distribu-
tion, collective eavesdropping detection, collective noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the principles of quantum me-
chanics have been widely applied in the field of information,
which has promoted rapid developments of quantum cryptog-
raphy and quantum computation. Since the pioneering work
of Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1], quantum cryptography
has attracted a great deal of attention and has become one
of the most promising applications of quantum information
processing. There are several remarkable branches of quantum
cryptography, including quantum key distribution (QKD) [1],
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [15],
[16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], quantum secret sharing
(QSS) [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], and secure multi-party
computation (SMC) [28], [29], [30], [31], [32]. As one of the
most important parts of quantum cryptographic protocols, the
multi-party quantum cryptographic protocol (MQCP) which
involves at least three participants, such as quantum private
comparison (QPC) protocols and QSS protocols, are more
complicated than the two-party ones. Therefore, more attention
is needed in the research of MQCPs.
In most MQCPs, the quantum information carriers need
to be transmitted for more than one time, and usually the
This work is supported by NSFC (Grant Nos. 61272057, 61170270,
61309029), Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project (Grant Nos.
YETP0475, YETP0477), BUPT Excellent Ph.D. Students Foundation (Grant
No. CX201441).
The authors are with State Key Laboratory of Networking and
Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommu-
nications, Beijing 100876, China. Wei Huang is also with Sci-
ence and Technology on Communication Security Laboratory, Chengdu,
610041, China. (e-mail: huangwei096505@yahoo.cn; wqy@bupt.edu.cn; lb-
hitmanbl@gmail.com; gaofei bupt@hotmail.com)
eavesdropping detection should be taken in every step of the
transmission of them. However, this detection strategy, which
is called step-by-step detection, always makes the protocols
inefficient and complicated. First, it is known that the security
analysis of quantum cryptographic protocols is based on the
error rate analysis with the theories in statistics. Hence, the
proportion of the detection states (i.e., states chosen for
eavesdropping) in the transmitted states should not be too
small. If the detection is taken in every step of the transmission
of the quantum information carriers, a lot of states will be
used for checking eavesdropping and the qubit efficiency of
the corresponding protocol will decrease with the increase
of the number of detections. Second, detecting in every step
of the transmission usually requires all the participants in
such protocol to be equipped with many quantum devices,
e.g., the quantum state measurement machine, the quantum
state generation machine or the quantum storage machine.
However, based on the current technology, these quantum
devices are still expensive because of the difficulties on their
constructions. As a consequence, it is uneconomical to require
that every participant be equipped with most of these quantum
devices. Apparently, MQCPs would be more efficient and
easier to realize if the detection is taken only once in the
whole procedure of the protocol. Fortunately, if a MQCP make
use of collective eavesdropping detection strategy, it could
meet such requirement. Collective detection is an efficient
and useful eavesdropping detection strategy for MQCPs. On
one hand, in a MQCP which employs the collective detection
strategy, the detection needs to be taken only once after the
whole transmission procedure of the quantum information
carriers. On the other hand, this strategy can also reduces the
hardware requirement for the implementation of the protocol
since all the users (except for the center who is responsible
for preparing and measuring states) only need to perform
certain unitary operations in the whole executing procedure
of the protocol. To date, much attention have been focused
on collective detection strategy and a lot of MQCPs haven
been proposed by utilizing it (For simplicity, we will call the
MQCP which uses collective detection MQCP-CD later) [33],
[34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40].
In a MQCP-CD, all the users (except for the center) just
need be capable of performing certain unitary operations.
Therefore, the operations performed by them are very impor-
tant to the security of the protocol. In this paper, a method for
constructing the operations which are needed in the MQCP-
CD is presented. It is a method that can be used to construct
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of the MQCP-CD, with different kinds of quantum states,
such as single photons, EPR pairs and GHZ states. Based on
this method, we present a multi-user quantum key distribution
(MQKD) protocol with collective detection and single parti-
cles. Our protocol is presented on a star network where any
two of the involved users can execute quantum key distribution
with the help of a serving center. There are several merits of
this protocol. First, to establish a random key by employing
this protocol, two users only need be capable of performing
certain unitary operations. Second, none of the participants
(all the users and the center) in our protocol need be equipped
with the quantum storage machine. As storing quantum qubits
is still a very difficult task in reality, our protocol is more
feasible than the ones [33], [34], [35] where the quantum
storage machine is required. In addition, our protocol can resist
various kinds of attacks from both the outside eavesdroppers
and a dishonest center.
Actually, the quantum states transmitted in channel will
interact with the environment uncontrollably, which will in-
troduce noise into the communication and influence both the
correctness and efficiency of communication. If the variation
of the noise is slower than the time delay between the quantum
states transmitted inside a time window, the states will be
affected by the same noise. This kind of noise is called
collective noise [41], [42]. To combat with the errors caused by
the collective noise, we further introduce three fault-tolerant
versions of our protocol with the ideas of decoherence-free
subspace (DFS) [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50],
[51], [52], [53], which can resist collective-dephasing noise,
collective-rotation noise and all kinds of unitary collective
noise, respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents our method for constructing the required
unitary operations which can be used in designing MQCP-
CD. In sect. 3, our MQKD protocol and its three fault-
tolerant versions, which utilize collective detection and block
transmission, are proposed in detail. Block transmission, which
was proposed firstly by Long et al. in [15], is one of the
most important techniques for transmitting quantum states in
quantum information processing. In block transmission, the
quantum states are ordered and transmitted in blocks, and the
eavesdropping detection is also executed on the blocks. In sect.
4, the security of our proposed protocols is analyzed by using
the theorems on quantum operation discrimination. Finally, a
discussion as well as a short conclusion is given in Sect. 5.
II. THE METHOD FOR CONSTRUCTING THE UNITARY
OPERATIONS REQUIRED IN THE MQCP-CD
Thus far, many MQCP-CDs [33], [34], [56], [57], [58] have
been attacked since the unitary operations used in these proto-
cols can be discriminated unambiguously (by a single use) if
an eavesdropper utilizes some special attack strategies, such as
dense-coding attack [34] and fake-signal attack [56]. It is just
because there is still no effective method for constructing the
required unitary operations that some improper ones were used
in these protocols. In this section, we introduce a method for
constructing the required unitary operations which can be used
in designing a secure MQCP-CD in detail. This method can be
used to construct the required unitary operations with different
kinds of quantum states. Afterwards, we prove the correctness
of this method based on the conclusions on quantum operation
discrimination.
A. The detailed method
Before presenting the method for constructing the re-
quired operations, we first introduce the basic principle of
the MQCP-CD in brief [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38],
[39], [40]. In this kind of protocols, two mutually unbiased
bases, which are denoted as {|a〉, |b〉} and {|c〉, |d〉}, are
required for secure communication. Here, 〈a|b〉=〈c|d〉= 0,
|〈a|c〉|2=|〈a|d〉|2=|〈b|c〉|2=|〈b|d〉|2=1/2. Besides, there should
be a center who is responsible for generating and measuring
quantum states. The center first generates a sequence of states
in the two bases and sends them to the first user. Then the
first user processes the received states by performing four
unitary operations according to his secret binary string and
controlling binary string. After his/her operations, the first
user sends the processed sequence to next user. Then the
following users execute the procedure just like what the first
user does one by one. When the last user finishes his/her
operations, he/she sends the sequence back to the center. After
the center receives the sequence, they randomly choose some
states to check eavesdropping with the information of the
unitary operations performed on the chosen states and the
corresponding measurement outcomes provided by the center.
If the whole transmitting procedure is secure, the remaining
states (or measurement outcomes) can be used to realize the
main function of the protocol.
Concretely, when a user receives the sequence of quantum
states, he/she first encodes his/her secret string by performing
the operation I (identity operator)/U (encoding operation) on
each of the received states if the corresponding bit of the
secret string is 0/1. The effect of the unitary operations U
is that it flips a state in the same MB, i.e. U |a〉 = α|b〉,
U |b〉 = β|a〉, U |c〉 = γ|d〉 and U |d〉 = δ|c〉. Here α, β, γ
and δ are global phase factors which can be ignored. After
that, he/she disturbs the encoded states by performing the
operation I/C (controlling operations) on each of these states
if the corresponding bit in his/her controlling string is 0/1. The
effect of the unitary operations C is that it flips each one of
the four states in {|a〉, |b〉, |c〉, |d〉} from one basis to the other
basis. When a user encodes his/her secret string on the received
states, each of the bits in this secret string and controlling
string will be used only once. If an eavesdropper wants to
get some information of a bit in the secret string without
leaving a trace in the eavesdropping detection, she/he should
have the ability of discriminating the four unitary operations
I , U , C and UC unambiguously with only one opportunity
(i.e., under the condition that the device can be accessed only
once). Therefore, one of the key steps in designing a secure
MQCP-CD is to find appropriate unitary operations U and C
which make I , U , C and UC impossible to be discriminated
unambiguously with a single use.
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Fig. 1. Take two-qubit unitary operations, for example. This figure illustrates
the definition of the function r(U) = r, where λ1, λ2, λ3 and λ4 are
eigenvalues of the matrix U and r is the distance between the origin of the
complex plane o and the polygon λ1λ2λ3λ4. Obviously, r = 0 indicates
that o is in/on the polygon λ1λ2λ3λ4..
Now we give the method for constructing the required
unitary operations. Suppose V is a d-dimensional Hilbert
space. By employing the Gram-Schmidt procedure, it is easy
to construct an orthonormal basis of V , {|0′〉, ..., |(d−1)′〉}. It
can be easily proved that {|0′〉, |1′〉} and {|+′〉, |−′〉} are two
mutually unbiased bases of a 2-dimentional subspace, where
|+′〉 = 1√
2
(|0′〉 − i|1′〉), |−′〉 = 1√
2
(|1′〉 − i|0′〉). (1)
Then the encoding operation is chosen in the form of
U = |0′〉〈1′|+ |1′〉〈0′|+M, (2)
where the part M should meet the following two conditions.
First, M should be in a proper form in order to make U be
an unitary operation, i.e. U †U=UU †=I; Second, M should
be orthogonal to both |0′〉 and |1′〉. It can be easily verified
that the operation U could flips each one of the states in
{|0′〉, |1′〉, |+′〉, |−′〉} in its own basis when M is in a
required form. There are many feasible choices for the form
of M , such as M = |2′〉〈2′| + · · · + |(d − 1)′〉〈(d − 1)′| and
M = |2′〉〈3′| + |3′〉〈4′| + · · · + |(d − 1)′〉〈2′|. After getting
the encoding operation U , we choose one of the square roots
of U as the controlling operation, which could flip each one
of the states in {|0′〉, |1′〉, |+′〉, |−′〉} from one basis to
the other basis, i.e. C =
√
U . The selection method for the
operation C will be given in the following proof. Thus far, a
method for constructing the required encoding operation and
controlling operation has been introduced. That is to say, if the
operations U and C are constructed by this method, the four
unitary operations I , U , C and UC cannot be discriminated
unambiguously with only one opportunity.
B. Proof of the proposed method
Herein we demonstrate that the four unitary operations
I , U , C and UC cannot be discriminated unambiguously
with only one opportunity if U and C are constructed by
our method. Before giving the proof, we first introduce an
important theorem on quantum operation discrimination.
Theorem 1 [60] Under the condition that the device can
be accessed only once, the minimum error probability to
discriminate the two unitary operations U1 and U2 is
Pe =
1
2
[
1−
√
1− 4p1p2r(U †1U2)
2
]
, (3)
where r(U †1U2) stands for the distance between the origin of
the complex plane and the polygon whose vertices are the
eigenvalues of the unitary operator U †1U2 (see also Fig. 1),
and U † is the adjoint matrix of U .
Corollary 2 Under the condition that the device can be
accessed only once, two unitary operations U1 and U2 can be
discriminated unambiguously if and only if r(U †1U2) = 0.
As defined in the presented method, C=
√
U (U=C2).
It can be easily found that r(I†C)=r(U †UC)=r(C),
r(U †C)=r(U−1C)=r(C−1)=r(C†). According to Theorem
1 and Corollary 2, under the condition that the device can
be accessed only once, the two operations U and C (I
and C, U and UC) constructed by our method cannot be
discriminated unambiguously if and only if neither of r(C†)
and r(C) is equal to zero. Now we demonstrate that both
r(C†) and r(C) are not equal to zero, i.e., r(C†)>0 and
r(C)>0. Since U is an unitary operation, all the eigenvalues
of U are the points on the unit circle in complex plane.
Namely, all the eigenvalues of U can be written in the form
of ei(θ+2kpi), here ei(θ+2kpi)=eiθ , θ∈[0, 2pi), k∈Z . Therefore,
all the eigenvalues of the operation
√
U should be in the
form of ei(β+kpi), here β= θ2∈[0, pi), k∈Z . It is obviously
that U has more than one square roots. Take the Pauli
operation σ0 as an simple example, since σ0 can be written
as either ei·0|0〉〈0|+ ei·0|1〉〈1| or ei·0|0〉〈0|+ ei·2pi|1〉〈1|, both
ei·0|0〉〈0|+ei·0|1〉〈1| and ei·0|0〉〈0|+ei·pi|1〉〈1| are the square
roots of σ0, i.e., σ0=σ20=σ2z . Here |0〉 and |1〉 represent the
horizontal and vertical polarizations of photons, respectively.
As is shown above, all the eigenvalues of the operation
√
U
should be in the form of ei(β+kpi), k∈Z . In the above method,
we choose the square root (of U ) whose eigenvalues are all in
the form of eiβ (which means that the corresponding parameter
k is even) as the controlling operation C. As β∈[0, pi), all
the the eigenvalues of C are the points on the upper half of
the unit circle (except for -1) in complex plane and therefore
r(C)>0. In addition, since all the the eigenvalues of C are
the points on the upper half of the unit circle (except for -1),
it is evident that all the the eigenvalues of C† are the points
on the bottom half of the unit circle (except for -1), which
means r(C†)>0. That is to say, the two operations U and
C (I and C, U and UC) constructed by our method cannot
be discriminated unambiguously under the condition that the
device can be accessed only once.
Till now, we have proved that the four unitary operations
I , U , C and UC constructed by the above method cannot
be discriminated unambiguously under the condition that the
device can be accessed only once. Utilizing this method, we
can construct the required unitary operations for designing a
secure MQCP-CD with different kinds of quantum states.
4C. The role of the proposed method
If someone wants to design a MQCP-CD using a certain
kind of quantum state in his/her favour, one of the most
important things he/she should do first is to find the corre-
sponding encoding operation (U ) and controlling operation
(C), which satisfy the security requirement of the MQCP-CD.
Obviously, the method we just proposed above can be used
to construct such unitary operations according to the quantum
states that the protocol designer wants to use. For example,
if he/she wants to design a MQCP-CD with single photons, a
natural choice for one of the two bases could be {|0〉, |1〉}. By
employing our method, the other basis could be chosen as{|+〉,
|−〉}, where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 − i|0〉),
and the corresponding encoding operation Us and controlling
operation Cs can be constructed as
Us = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0| =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
Cs =
√
Us =
1 + i
2
(
1 −i
−i 1
)
. (4)
It can be easily verified that {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} form
two mutually unbiased bases. The effect of the operations Us
and Cs on the four states can be illustrated as
Us|0〉 = |1〉, Us|1〉 = |0〉,
Us|+〉 = |−〉, Us|−〉 = |+〉,
Cs|0〉 = (1+i√2 )|+〉, Cs|1〉 = (1+i√2 )|−〉,
Cs|+〉 = (1−i√2 )|1〉, Cs|−〉 = (1−i√2 )|0〉. (5)
Utilizing the two bases and two operations (Us and Cs)
given above, one can design different kinds of MQCP-CDs
(QSS, QPC, etc.) with single photons. Evidently, there are
still some other choices for the two operations if we choose
other single particles to be the quantum information carriers.
To date, in order to improve the qubit efficiency or reduce the
hardware requirement of the users, some MQCP-CDs [33],
[34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40] have been proposed with
single photons. Unfortunately, all of these protocols need to
store quantum qubits, which is still a difficult task in reality.
To make use of collective detection under the current tech-
niques, we present a more feasible MQKD protocol without
employing quantum storage machine in next section. More
importantly, we also enhance the proposed protocol to be
immune to the errors over different collective-noise channel
based on the above method.
III. THE PROPOSED MQKD PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present a MQKD protocol by employing
single particles and collective detection on a star network. In
this protocol, there is a center who is responsible for generat-
ing and measuring quantum states. With the help of the center,
any two users involved in the network can securely establish
a random key just by performing unitary operations on the
states transmitted to them. If user-i wants to share a random
key with user-j, user-i and user-j can encode their random
Center
User-1
User-2
User-3
User-4
User-5
User-6
User-7
Fig. 2. A simple illustration of the MQKD with 7 users on a star network.
In this network, any two of the 7 users can establish a shared secret key only
with unitary operations.
binary strings into the states produced by the center, and then
they are able to deduce a random key with the measurement
outcomes published by the center, where 1≤i, j≤n. In this
circumstance, user-i and user-j only need to hide their secrets
in the transmitted states with proper unitary operations. In
this network, we assume that any two of the participants (the
center and all the users) are able to transmit quantum states
between each other. Similar to most of the previous quantum
cryptographic protocols, the classical channels involved in this
protocol are supposed to be authenticated. Compared with
the existing MQKD protocols which also utilize collective
detection [33], [34], [35], our protocol have the following two
advantages. On one hand, it can be secure against the attacks
from both the outside eavesdroppers and a dishonest center.
On the other hand, it need not make use of quantum storage
machine, which indicates that our protocol is more feasible in
practice under the current techniques.
A. The proposed MQKD protocol with single particles
Table 4. The relationship among the values of A¯j , B¯j , A¯′j+B¯′j
and Cj when no errors occur.
A¯j B¯j A¯
′
j+B¯
′
j Cj
A¯j B¯j 0 or 1 A¯j⊕B¯j
A¯j B¯j 2 A¯j⊕B¯j⊕1
Assuming that two users involved in the network, say Alice
and Bob, want to share a random key, they could execute the
MQKD protocol described as below (see also Fig. 3).
1: Alice generates two random binary strings of length 4n,
which are denoted as A and A′, respectively. Similarly,
Bob generates two random binary strings of length 4n,
which are denoted as B and B′, respectively. After that,
Alice informs the center that she wants to establish a
random key with Bob.
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Fig. 3. The subsystem of the presented QKD network with single particles.
2: After receives Alice’s request, the center prepares a
sequence of 4n single particles which are all in the state
|0〉 (denoted as sequence S) and sends it to Alice.
3: Once receiving S, Alice performs the unitary operations
UAi and CA′i on the i-th particle in S, for 1≤i≤4n.
Here, Ai and A′i are respectively the i-th bit in strings
A and A′. U1=Us, C1=Cs and U0=C0=Is is the identity
density operator on two-dimensional Hilbert space, i.e.,
Is=|0〉〈0|+|1〉〈1|. After that, she sends the new sequence
(denoted as S1) to Bob.
4: Upon receiving the sequence S1, Bob performs the opera-
tions UBi and CB′i on the i-th particle in S1, for 1≤i≤4n.
Then he sends the the new sequence (denoted as S2) back
to the center.
5: Once receiving S2, the center makes measurement on
each of the particles randomly in σz-basis or σy-basis,
where σz-basis={|0〉,|1〉} and σy-basis={|+〉,|−〉}. Af-
terwards, he/she publishes the measurement outcome of
each of the particles in S2. According to the i-th measure-
ment outcome announced by the center, Alice and Bob
could learn which of the two bases was used to measure
the i-th particle in S2. Concretely, if the measurement
outcome is |0〉 or |1〉 (|+〉 or |−〉), σz-basis (σy-basis)
was used.
6: After the center announced the measurement outcomes
of all the particles in S2, Alice and Bob publish A′ and
B′, respectively, where A′i (B′i) indicates that whether
Alice (Bob) has performed Cs on the i-th particle in the
travelling sequence. Based on the announced information,
Alice and Bob are able to determine which of the particles
in S2 were measured in correct bases. Here measuring
the i-th particle in correct basis represents that the i-th
measurement outcome is |0〉 or |1〉 (|+〉 or |−〉) under the
condition that A′i+B′i is 0 or 2 (1). According to proba-
bilistic theory, half of the particles in S2 (i.e., 2 n particles
in S2) have been measured by the center with correct
measuring bases. For the positions of the measurement
outcomes obtained from incorrect measuring bases, Alice
and Bob discard the corresponding bits in A, B, A′ and
B′, where the new strings are denoted as A¯, B¯, A¯′ and B¯′,
respectively. Then Alice and Bob could deduce a 2n-bit
string C with the measurement outcomes obtained with
correct measuring bases. Concretely, if the measurement
outcome is |0〉 or |+〉 (|1〉 or |−〉), the corresponding
bit of C is 0 (1). The relationship among the values of
A¯j , B¯j , A¯′j+B¯
′
j and Cj when no error occurs is shown
in Table 4, where 1≤j≤2n and ⊕ denotes the addition
module 2.
7: To check eavesdropping, Bob randomly chooses n posi-
tions out of string C and requires Alice to tell him the
corresponding bits in A¯. According to the information
announced by Alice and Table 4, Bob checks whether
the corresponding bits in C are in accordance with the
theoretical values. If more than an acceptable error rate
is found, they abort the results; otherwise, Bob can trust
the transmission and deduce the rest n bits of A¯ with the
corresponding bits of C and B¯. At last, Alice and Bob
utilize error correction and privacy amplification [54],
[55] to establish the secure session key.
In this protocol, with the help of the center, any two of the
involved users can establish a random key only with unitary
operations. Although the qubit efficiency of our protocol is
half as those of the protocols in Refs. [33], [34], [35], our
protocol need not store quantum qubits. Hence, our protocol
is more feasible with the the current techniques. Besides, the
users should set up the filter and the beam splitter to prevent
the Trojan horse attack and invisible-photon attack [63], [64].
IV. FAULT-TOLERANT MQKD PROTOCOLS AGAINST
COLLECTIVE NOISE
Herein we introduce three fault-tolerant versions of the
proposed MQKD protocol based on the method in Sect. 2
and the idea of DFS, which can be immune to the collective-
dephasing noise, collective-rotation noise and all kinds of
unitary collective noise, respectively.
A. Fault-tolerant MQKD protocol against collective-
dephasing noise
The collective-dephasing noise [41], [44], [65] can be
described as
|0〉 −→ |0〉, |1〉 −→ eiφ|1〉, (6)
where φ is the noise parameter and it fluctuates with time.
A logical qubit, which is composed with two physical qubits
with antiparallel parity (as bellow), is immune to collective-
dephasing noise as both the logical qubits obtains the same
phase factor eiφ through this kind of channel.
|0〉L = |0〉|1〉, |1〉L = |1〉|0〉. (7)
To communicate securely, at least two non-orthogonal mea-
suring bases are required. According to the presented method,
one basis could be {|0〉L, |0〉L}, and the other one is {|+〉L,
|−〉L}, where
|+〉L = 1√
2
(|0〉L − i|1〉L), |−〉L = 1√
2
(|1〉L − i|0〉L). (8)
6It can be easily verified that |〈+|0〉L|2=|〈+|1〉L|2=|〈−|0〉L|2=
|〈−|1〉L|2= 12 , which indicates that {|0〉L, |1〉L} and {|+〉L,
|−〉L} form two mutually unbiased bases. Based on the
method given in Sect. 2, we construct the encoding operation
Udp and controlling operation Cdp for our MQKD protocol,
which can resist collective-dephasing noise, as follows:
Udp = |0〉LL〈1|+ |1〉LL〈0|+M
= |01〉〈10|+ |10〉〈01|+ |00〉〈11|+ |11〉〈00|
=


0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

 ,
Cdp =
√
Udp =
1 + i
2


1 0 0 −i
0 1 −i 0
0 −i 1 0
−i 0 0 1

 . (9)
The effect of the operations Udp and Cdp on the four states
can be illustrated as
Udp|0〉L = |1〉L, Udp|1〉L = |0〉L,
Udp|+〉L = |−〉L, Udp|−〉L = |+〉L,
Cdp|0〉L = (1+i√2 )|+〉L, Cdp|+〉L = (1−i√2 )|1〉L,
Cdp|1〉L = (1+i√2 )|−〉L, Cdp|−〉L = (
1−i√
2
)|0〉L. (10)
As in this case with collective-dephasing noise, with the
help of the center, any two of the involved users can establish
a shared secret key over collective-dephasing channel with the
same steps of the protocol given in Sect. 3.1. Certainly, there
are some differences between these two cases. On one hand,
the four states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉 should be respectively
replaced by |0〉L, |1〉L, |+〉L and |−〉L. On the other hand,
the unitary operations Is, Us and Cs should be substituted
with I⊗2s , Udp and Cdp, respectively, where I⊗2s =Is⊗Is.
Accordingly, the measuring bases used by the center in step
5 should be replaced by {|0〉L, |1〉L} and {|+〉L, |−〉L}.
B. Fault-tolerant MQKD protocol against collective-rotation
noise
The collective-rotation noise [41], [44], [65] can be de-
scribed as
|0〉 −→ cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉,
|1〉 −→ − sin θ|0〉+ cos θ|1〉, (11)
where θ is the parameter of noise which fluctuates
with time. The two Bell states, |Φ+〉= 1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉) and
|Ψ−〉= 1√
2
(|01〉−|10〉), are invariant under this collective-
rotation noise. Naturally, logical qubits under this noise can
be chosen as
|0r〉L = |Φ+〉, |1r〉L = |Ψ−〉. (12)
For secure communication, at least two non-orthogonal mea-
suring bases are required. According to the presented method,
one basis could be {|0r〉L, |0r〉L}, and the other one is {|+r〉L,
|−r〉L}, where
|+r〉L = 1√
2
(|0r〉L − i|1r〉L),
|−r〉L = 1√
2
(|1r〉L − i|0r〉L). (13)
It is easy to verify that |〈r+|0r〉L|2=|〈r+|1r〉L|2=|〈r−|0r〉L|2
=|〈r−|1r〉L|2= 12 , which indicates that {|0r〉L, |1r〉L} and
{|+r〉L, |−r〉L} form two mutually unbiased bases. Using the
method given in Sect. 2, we construct the encoding operation
Ur and controlling operation Cr for the MQKD protocol over
collective-rotation channel as follows:
Ur = |0r〉LL〈1r|+ |1r〉LL〈r0|+Mr
= |φ+〉〈ψ−|+ |ψ−〉〈φ+|+ |ψ+〉〈φ−|+ |φ−〉〈ψ+|
=


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
0 0 −1 0

 ,
Cr =
√
Ur =
1 + i
2


1 −i 0 0
−i 1 0 0
0 0 1 i
0 0 i 1

 . (14)
The effect of the operations Ur and Cr on the four states can
be illustrated as
Ur|0r〉L = |1r〉L, Ur|1r〉L = |0r〉L,
Ur|+r〉L = |−r〉L, Ur|−r〉L = |+r〉L,
Cr |0r〉L = (1+i√2 )|+r〉L, Cr|+r〉L = (
1−i√
2
)|1r〉L,
Cr|1r〉L = (1+i√2 )|−r〉L, Cr|−r〉L = (
1−i√
2
)|0r〉L. (15)
As in this case with collective-rotation noise, with the help
of the center, any two of the involved users can establish
a shared secret key over collective-rotation channel with the
same steps of the protocol presented in Sect. 3.1. Of course,
there are some differences between these two cases. One
difference is that the four states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉 should
be respectively replaced by |0r〉L, |1r〉L, |+r〉L and |−r〉L.
Another difference is that the unitary operations Is, Us and
Cs should be substituted with I⊗2s , Ur and Cr, respectively.
Accordingly, the measuring basis used by the center in step
5 should be replaced by basis {|0r〉L, |1r〉L} and {|+r〉L,
|−r〉L}.
C. Fault-tolerant MQKD protocol against all kinds of unitary
collective noise
Decoherence-free (DF) states [42], [53] is a type of states
which are changeless under any n-lateral unitary transforma-
tion (i.e., U⊗n|ψ−〉 = |ψ−〉, where U⊗n=U⊗· · ·⊗U denotes
the tensor product of n unitary transformations U ). The
amount of quantum information that a given N -qubit DFS
is able to protect depends on the number of its qubits. For
N even, the DFS spanned by states which are eigenstates of
the whole Hamiltonian of the qubit-bath system has dimension
[42], [49]
d(N) =
N !
(N/2)!(N/2 + 1)!
(16)
7For N=2, there exists only one DF state, the singlet state |ψ−〉.
For N=4, the dimension of the DFS is 2. Hence, 4 qubits are
sufficient to fully protect one arbitrary logical qubit from all
kinds of unitary collective noise [49]. A natural choice for the
orthogonal basis of the 4-qubit DFS is
|0¯〉L = |ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34
=
1
2
(|0101〉+ |1010〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉)1234,
|1¯〉L = 1
2
√
3
(2|0011〉+ 2|1100〉 − |0101〉
−|1010〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉)1234. (17)
To communicate securely, at least two non-orthogonal mea-
suring bases are required. According to the presented method,
One basis could be {|0¯〉L, |1¯〉L}, and the other should be
chosen as {|+¯〉L, |−¯〉L}, where
|+¯〉L = 1√
2
(|0¯〉L − i|1¯〉L), |−¯〉L = 1√
2
(|1¯〉L − i|0¯〉L). (18)
It can be easily verified that |〈+¯|0¯〉L|2=|〈+¯|1¯〉L|2=|〈−¯|0¯〉L|2
=|〈−¯|1¯〉L|2= 12 , which means {|0¯〉L, |1¯〉L} and {|+¯〉L, |−¯〉L}
form two mutually unbiased bases. Let us suppose W is
the 4-qubit Hilbert space whose dimension is 16, then we
are able to find an orthonormal basis {|0¯〉L, |1¯〉L, |1¯5〉}
for W by employing the Gram-Schmidt procedure. For the
sake of simplicity, we do not give the concrete form of the
states |2¯〉L, |3¯〉L, ..., |1¯5〉 as the well known Gram-Schmidt
procedure is not complicated. Once obtaining all the states of
the orthonormal basis, we can construct the corresponding en-
coding operation U¯ and controlling operation C¯ for our robust
MQKD protocol based the presented method. Specifically, the
encoding operation U¯ and controlling operation C¯ are in the
form as
U¯ = |0¯〉〈1¯|+ |1¯〉〈0¯|+O, C¯ =
√
U¯ . (19)
Here, we have many feasible choices for the from of O, such
as O = |2¯〉〈2¯|+, ...+ |1¯5〉〈1¯5| and O = |2¯〉〈3¯|+ |3¯〉〈4¯|+ ...+
|1¯5〉〈2¯|. For example, when O = |2¯〉〈3¯|+ |3¯〉〈4¯|+ ...+ |1¯5〉〈2¯|,
the effect of the operations U¯ and C¯ on the states can be
illustrated as below.
U¯ |0¯〉L = |1¯〉L, U¯ |1¯〉L = |0¯〉L,
U¯ |+¯〉L = |−¯〉L, U¯ |−¯〉L = |+¯〉L,
C¯|0¯〉L = (1+i√2 )|+¯〉L, C¯|+¯〉L = (
1−i√
2
)|1¯〉L,
C¯|1¯〉L = (1+i√2 )|−¯〉L, C¯|−¯〉L = (1−i√2 )|0¯〉L. (20)
As in this case with all kinds of unitary collective noise,
with the help of the center, any two of the involved users can
establish a shared secret key over all kinds of collective-noise
channels with the same steps described in the protocol protocol
proposed in Sect. 3.1. Certainly, there are some differences
between these two cases. That is, the four states |0〉, |1〉,
|+〉 and |−〉 should be respectively substituted with |0¯〉L,
|1¯〉L, |+¯〉L and |−¯〉L, and the unitary operations Is, Udp
and Cdp should be replaced by I⊗4s , U¯ and C¯, respectively.
Accordingly, the center should utilize the bases {|0¯〉L, |1¯〉L}
and {|+¯〉L, |−¯〉L} to measure each of the states in S2 in step
5.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the MQKD
protocol with single particles. For the security of the ones
over collective-noise channels, it can be analyzed in the same
way with the case with single particles. For clarity, we first
consider the attacks from outside eavesdroppers. After that, we
take into account the situation where a center tries to eavesdrop
the key.
A. Security against outside attacks
Let us assume that Eve is an attacker who wants to eavesdrop
the users’ secret key without being noticed in the eavesdrop-
ping detection. Eve could intercept the traveling particles sent
to the receiver and replace them with the ones prepared by
herself [56], or she can entangle the travelling particles with
additional states and try to extract information from these
states [66]. Since the secret strings of the users are encoded
in the operations performed on the travelling particles, the
action to eavesdrop the a user’s secret strings is equivalent
to discriminate the operations that he/she has performed. For
instance, if Eve wants to get the value of Ai (1≤i≤4n), she
should know which one of the operations Is, Us, Cs and
UsCs Alice has performed on the corresponding particle. In
other words, Eve should be capable of discriminating the
four unitary operations. Actually, conclusions on quantum
operation discrimination have been well studied. In addition
to Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, here we introduce another
conclusion.
Theorem 3 [61] The quantum operations γ1, ..., γn can be
unambiguously discriminated by a single use if and only if for
any i=1, 2, ..., n, supp(γi) * supp(Si), where supp(γ) denotes
the support of a quantum operation γ and Si = {γj : j 6= i}.
In the proposed protocol with single particles, the unitary
operations performed by both the two users (Alice and Bob)
can be viewed as four unitary operations as a whole, i.e.
Is, Us, Cs and UsCs. Here, Is is the identity density op-
erator on two-dimensional Hilbert space and the operations
Us and Cs are respectively the encoding operation and con-
trolling operation defined in equation (4). It could be easily
found that these operations satisfy the following relationship,
Cs=
1+i
2 (1 · Is − i · Us+0 · UsCs)= 1+i2 (Is − iUs), which
indicates that supp{Cs} ⊆ supp{Is, Us, UsCs}. Therefore,
these four operations cannot be unambiguously discriminated
by a single use (i.e., with only one opportunity) according to
Theorem 3. Moreover, we can also get the same conclusion
according to Theorem 1. For example, the eigenvalues of the
operation U †sCs are 1 and −i, therefore, r(U †sCs) = 1/
√
2 and
the minimum error probability to discriminate Us and Cs is
Pe =
1
2
[
1−
√
1− (1/
√
2)
2
]
≈ 0.15 (21)
Just in this way, we can also get that the minimum error
probability to discriminate Is and Cs/Is and UsCs/Us and
UsCs is Pe(≈ 0.15), which means that these operations cannot
be discriminated unambiguously under the condition that the
device can be accessed only once.
8In the proposed protocol, the users’ secret strings are
encoded in the operations they performed on the states. If Eve
wants to get some information of a bit of a user’s secret string
without leaving a trace in the eavesdropping detection, she
should have the ability of unambiguously finding out which of
Is, Us, Cs and UsCs has been performed on the corresponding
particle with only one opportunity. However, as we analyzed
above, the four operations cannot be unambiguously discrim-
inated under this condition. Consequently, the well-known
attacks, such as intercept-resend attack, measurement-resend
attack, entanglement-measure attack and dense-coding attack,
from an outside eavesdropper will inevitably be detected in
the eavesdropping detection.
Furthermore, as for the two special attacks for two-way
communication, i.e., Trojan horse attack and invisible-photon
attack, the users and center can makes use of the methods in
[63], [64] to protect the proposed protocols from such attacks.
Hence, we omit the redundant description here.
B. Security against the center’s attacks
It is known that the attacks from of a dishonest participant is
more powerful than those from the outside eavesdroppers. On
one hand, he/she knows part of the legal information. On the
other hand, he/she could tell lies in the the executing procedure
of the protocol in order to avoid introducing errors into the
eavesdropping detection. Therefore, the attacks from dishonest
participants should be paid more attention to. In fact, such
situations should also be considered in our protocol. First, in
the case that the enter has been corrupted by others, it may
try to eavesdrop the random key shared between the users.
Second, in some special situations, the center may be out
of service and the person who has the ability of generating
and measuring the quantum states may want to eavesdrop the
key. That is, the one who is able to substitute the center may
be dishonest. Now, we show that, if the users executing the
proposed protocol, a dishonest center cannot get the random
key without leaving a trace in the eavesdropping detection,
Compared with the outside eavesdroppers, a dishonest cen-
ter has the following two superiorities. First, he/she could
replace the particles in S with whatever kind of states he/she
wants. Second, he/she could modify the measurement out-
comes which are announced in step 5. Nevertheless, he/she is
still unable to get the key shared between by the users without
being noticed in the eavesdropping detection of our protocol.
According to the analysis given above, no matter what kind of
states the dishonest center prepared in step 2, he/she is unable
to unambiguously discriminate the four unitary operations that
performed by the users under the condition that the device
can be accessed only once. In other words, these four unitary
operations cannot be precisely discriminated when they are
performed on a single qubit or one qubit of any entangled
state, respectively. That is to say, if the center utilizes a
strategy to to discriminate these four operations, he/she will
get incorrect outcome with a non-negligible probability. In
our protocol, the users will announce the controlling string
A′ and B′ only after the center publishes the measurement
outcomes of all the particles in S2. Also the bits utilized to
check eavesdropping is randomly chosen by the users after the
measurement outcomes being published. Since the dishonest
center cannot precisely discriminate the four unitary operations
utilized in our protocol with a single use, no matter what
attack strategy he/she employs, once he/she could get part
of the useful information about the secret string, he/she will
inevitably introduce errors into the eavesdropping detection
and hence be noticed by the users.
Till now, we have analyzed the security of the MQKD
protocol in sect. 3.1 to show that it is secure against at-
tacks from both the outside eavesdroppers and the dishonest
center. Of course, as for the cases of collective-dephasing
noise/collective-rotation noise/all kinds of unitary collective
noise, we can also show that it could be immune to all the
present attacks just in the same way, since the operations I⊗2,
Udp, Cdp and UdpCdp / I⊗2, Ur, Cr and UrCr/I⊗4, U¯ , C¯
and U¯C¯ cannot be discriminated unambiguously (under the
condition that the device can be accessed only once) according
to both the theorems given above. Thus, we do not elaborate
on the proof processes for simplicity.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A. Discussion
To combat with the errors over collective-noise channel,
Zhang has proposed a well-known fault-tolerant multiparty
quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol [27]. It is easy to
find that this MQSS protocol can also be used for MQKD.
However, there are clear differences between this protocol
and our protocol. First, by utilizing our protocol, two arbitrary
users could establish a secret key with the help of a center,
and then they could utilize this key for secure communication
between each other. In this circumstance, the center is unable
to get any useful information of the shared key. While by
employing Zhang’s protocol, a boss could establish a joint
key with his/her agent entirety. Only when all the agents
collaborate can they deduce the joint key that has been
shared with the boss and then utilize this key for secure
communication with the boss. Second, as there exists a serving
center in our protocol, if two of the involved users want to
establish a secret key, they only need be capable of performing
certain unitary operations. Nevertheless, in Zhang’s protocol,
if the boss wants to establish a joint key with his/her agent
entirety, the boss should be able to generate quantum states,
and the agent entirely should be capable of performing a
certain unitary operation and measuring quantum states. In
addition, to establish a secret key, the quantum states sequence
should be transmitted three times in our protocol, while the
sequence in Zhang’s protocol only need be transmitted twice.
In fact, with some minor modifications, the protocol pro-
posed in Sect. 3 can also be used for secret sharing of a
random key. Concretely, if we want this protocol to be used for
QSS, the following modifications are needed. Firstly, in step
5, after the center finish measuring all the received particles,
he/she notifies the fact to Alice and Bob. Different to the
original protocol, he/she no longer publishes the measurement
outcomes. Secondly, in step 6, once receiving the center’s
9notification, Alice and Bob publish A¯′ and B¯′. With this
information, the center judges which of the received particles
have been measured in correct measuring basis. Then he/her
informs Alice and Bob of the positions of the particles which
have been measured incorrectly. For the positions of the
measurement outcomes obtained from incorrect measuring
bases, Alice and Bob discard the corresponding bits in A, B,
A′ and B′, and obtain the new strings which are denoted as
A¯, B¯, A¯′ and B¯′, respectively. Also, the center deduces a 2n-
bit string C according to the corresponding 2n measurement
outcomes obtained from correct measuring bases. The rela-
tionship among the bit values of A¯j , B¯j , A¯′j+B¯′j and Cj is
shown in Table 4, where 1≤j≤2n. Thirdly, in step 7, the center
randomly chooses n positions out of string C and requires
Alice and Bob to tell him/her the corresponding bits in A¯ and
B¯, respectively. According to the received information and
Table 4, the center checks whether there exist eavesdropping
in the executing procedure of the protocol. If there exists no
eavesdropping, the center has successfully established a joint
key with Alice and Bob. That is to say, only when Alice and
Bob collaborate can they first establish a joint key with center
and then extract the secret messages from the enter’s encrypted
messages later transmitted via a public channel.
So far, we have shown that the protocol proposed in
Sect. 3 could be used for three-party QSS with some minor
modifications. Nevertheless, the security requirement for QSS
has certain differences with QKD. On one hand, the boss
(i.e., the message sender) of a QSS protocol is honest. On
the other hand, the agents (i.e., sharers) of a QSS protocol
may be dishonest. That is to say, some dishonest agents may
cooperate to attack the protocol and try to get the key without
the help of other agents. According to the security analysis
given in Sect. 4, it is not hard to find that the three-party
QSS we just mentioned above is secure. However, when the
number of the agents is more than 2, many more threatening
attacking strategies for QSS, such as entanglement swapping
attack [38], should be considered. That is to say, to extend
the above three-party protocol to an n-party one, some extra
strategies should be employed for resisting these attacks. As
the related strategies have been discussed somewhere [39], we
do not focus on this issue here.
B. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a method for constructing the
encoding operations and controlling operations, which are
required in the MQCP-CD. Then by employ single particles
and collective detection, we present a MQKD protocol on
a star network without storing qubits, which can resist the
attacks from both the outside eavesdroppers and the dishonest
center. Based on the proposed method and the idea of DFS,
we also introduce three fault-tolerant versions of the proposed
protocol over collective-dephasing noise channel, collective-
rotation noise channel and all kinds of unitary collective noised
channel.
Obviously, the method we presented in this paper is useful
as it can be used to construct the unitary operations required
in the MQCP-CD with different kinds of quantum states.
Compared with the the existing MQCP-CDs [33], [34], [35],
[36], [37], [38], [39], [40], the protocols proposed in this paper
have the following advantages. First, the proposed protocols
are more feasible since they do not need to employ quantum
storage machine. Second, the proposed protocols can not
only utilize collective detection, but also be immune to the
collective noise.
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